A common explanation for the decline in unionization maintains that structural change has led to employment shifts away from sectors that are highly unionized and towards sectors with low union density. This paper examines the decline of unionization in Canada and the United States during 1984 -1998 --a period in which union coverage fell by 8 percentage points in the United States and 7 percentage points in Canada. We find that structural factors account for little of the observed change in union density --about 20 percent of the American decline and none of the Canadian decline. The remainder is due to a substantial fall in the likelihood of a worker with a given set of characteristics being unionized. Factors that might cause such a drop include increased management opposition to unions, changes in legislation that make union organizing more difficult and growth in union substitute services.
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I. Introduction
Unionization has declined substantially in several Anglo-Saxon countries, especially the U.S. and UK. In contrast, in Canada the extent of union representation has been relatively stable.
Nonetheless, during the turbulent decades of the 1980s and 1990s Canada experienced a gradual but steady decline in union density. The principal objective of this paper is to analyse the causes of the decline in union coverage observed in Canada during the past two decades. For comparative perspective we also examine the causes of changes in U.S. unionization during the same period. Figure 1 shows union density -measured as union membership as a percent of nonagricultural paid workers -over the 1920-1998 period. Until the mid-1960s, Canadian union growth behaved similarly to that in the U.S. Thereafter, however, the patterns diverged.
Beginning in the late 1960s, union density rose in Canada from about 30% to over 35% by 1975 but declined in the U.S., especially after 1980. By the mid-1980s a typical Canadian worker was twice as likely to be represented by a union as his or her American counterpart. This gap in the likelihood of union coverage existed in both the public and private sectors and across a wide range of demographic and labour force characteristics (Riddell, 1993) . However, beginning in the early to mid-1980s union density began a gradual but steady decline in Canada. In fact, by 1998, union density had fallen to 32.5%, a level not seen in Canada since the late 1960s.
Canadian research on unionization and its impacts has long been hampered by the lack of household data in which the union status of individual workers is observed. This situation has improved substantially in recent years. This study uses micro-data on individual workers to estimate models of the extent of union coverage in the early 1980s and late 1990s. We then use these estimates to investigate the sources of the change in union density observed over this period.
The causes of the decline in unionization in the U.S. and UK have been the subject of considerable research and debate. One popular explanation holds that a major contributing factor is structural change in the economy and labour force that results in employment growing relatively rapidly in sectors that traditionally have had a low propensity to unionize and declining --in relative, if not absolute terms --in sectors that traditionally have had a high proportion of workers represented by unions (Farber, 1985; Dickens and Leonard, 1985; Troy, 1990; 1993) .
Examples of these sorts of structural shifts in employment include the growth of female, parttime, white collar and service sector employment and the relative decline of primary, manufacturing, male, full time, and blue collar employment. The experience in some countries of relatively rapid growth in self-employment and employment in small and medium sized enterprises is another example of this type of structural change. We refer to this as the 'structural change' or simply 'structural' hypothesis. According to this perspective, the extent of union organization in the economy could decline even if there is no change in the likelihood of union coverage of a worker with a given set of demographic and individual characteristics (for example, a blue collar male working full time in the manufacturing industry).
Other explanations for changes in union density emphasize reasons why the propensity for union representation may decline for a worker with given characteristics. Several such forces have been suggested, especially in the context of declining unionization in the U.S. One factor, emphasized by Weiler (1983) and Freeman (1985 Freeman ( , 1988 , is the rise in management opposition to unions in the U.S. Changes in the legal regime -the laws and their interpretation and administration -relating to union formation and collective bargaining have also been put forward as factors contributing to declining success in union organizing as well as to increased management opposition to unions (Weiler, 1983; Johnson, 2001; Riddell, 2001) . Increased trade and openness and a generally more competitive global economic environment are also argued to have reduced the attractiveness of unions to employees and to have increased the desire of employers to operate in a "union free environment".
Another hypothesis is that there has been a reduction in the demand for collective representation because of the growth of substitute services. For example, Neumann and Rissman (1984) argue that governments have gradually provided more of the employment protection and non-wage benefits that were originally factors contributing to workers' desire for collective representation and action. Similarly, employers have increasingly become more sophisticated in their human resources practices and now provide services such as grievance procedures that previously only existed in unionized firms (Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1986 ).
An additional explanation advanced by Lipset (1986) is that there has been in the U.S. a reduction in public support for unions and collective bargaining. This shift in attitudes has reduced workers' desire for collective forms of representation. Lipset (1990) also attributes much of the Canada -U.S. differential in union density to fundamental value differences in the two societies -with Canadians placing more reliance on government, state intervention in the economy, and collective forms of organization and Americans being more oriented towards free enterprise and individual rather than collective rights.
The common feature of these various non-structural explanations is that they predict a decline in the likelihood that a worker with a given set of characteristics will be represented by a union. This change in the propensity to be unionized may occur because of changes in the demand for union representation (for example, because of changes in preferences for collective forms of representation) or changes in the supply (for example, if unions reduce the number of certification attempts because of increased management opposition). We refer to this group of explanations as the "propensity to unionize" hypothesis.
In this paper we assess the extent to which the gradual decline in union density that took place in Canada -and the similar but larger fall in the United States -during the 1980s and 1990s was due to changes in the structure of the economy and labour force or due to changes in the propensity of an individual worker to be unionized 1 . Our principal finding is that, for both countries, most of the drop in union density in the 1984-1998 period can be attributed to changes in the likelihood of an individual worker being unionized. For Canada in particular, none of the decline in union coverage can be attributed to changes in the structure of the economy and workforce.
II. Empirical framework
The growth and incidence of unionization can be analysed using a demand and supply framework (Ashenfelter and Pencavel, 1969; Pencavel, 1971; Farber, 1983) . The demand for union representation emanates from employees and depends on the expected benefits and costs of collective representation. The supply of unionization emanates from the organizing and contract administration activities of union leaders and their staff. Employers can affect the demand for union representation by altering the costs and/or benefits as perceived by unorganized employees. Employers may also influence the supply of unionization by changing the costs and/or benefits to union leaders of representing existing members and organizing new members.
Thus union status is determined by the decisions made by individual workers, employers and union leaders and their staff. Let
= 0 otherwise where i refers to individual worker i and t refers to year t, and
Equation (1) is a reduced-form equation that reflects the combined outcome of demand and supply factors on union status. y it is an unobserved variable that incorporates the net benefits of union coverage to worker i and the influences of the behavior of employers and union leaders and organizers. e it is a random error term. X it is a set of demographic and individual characteristics of workers and B t is a vector of parameters, which we allow to change over time.
In terms of the hypotheses discussed previously, the structure of the labour force and economy is captured by the set of control variables X it and the propensity to unionize is captured by the vector of parameters B t . That is, each element of the parameter vector B t represents the marginal effect of the associated characteristic (the associated element of the set of controls X it ) on the likelihood of worker i being covered by a collective agreement. 
where b 84 and b 98 are the estimated parameter vectors from the linear probability model.
The first term on the right hand side of equation (3) is the portion due to structural change in the economy and labour force. The magnitude of this term depends on the change between 1984 and 1998 in the portion of the labour force that is female, works part-time, is employed in the public sector, and similarly for other characteristics such as age, education, industry, occupation, province, and job tenure. The second term on the right hand side is the portion of the total change in coverage that is associated with changes in the propensity to unionize of a worker with a given set of characteristics. The magnitude of this term depends on the changes between 1984 and 1998 in the parameters b t , or the marginal effects of a given characteristic on the likelihood of unionization.
States. 2 The probit results are available from the authors.
IV. Data
For 1990s (1990-92) . The slump in the early 1990s was especially severe (Fortin, 1996) and the recovery from that downturn was extremely slow and uneven. Only after 1995 did a gradual recovery begin to take hold, in contrast to the situation in the 1980s when the economy bounced back relatively quickly from the 1981-82 recession. In both 1984 and 1998 the economy had returned to a normal level of economic activity but had not yet reached a cyclical peak. Unfortunately 1984 and 1998 were not as comparable for the United States since the American economy was close to a cyclical peak in 1998, but still approaching a peak in 1984. However, all things considered including data constraints, these two years are the best available options.
Both surveys include (identical) questions on union membership and collective agreement coverage. Because we wish to distinguish between the 'unionized sector' and the 'nonunion sector' we prefer to use coverage as a measure of union status. All Canadian jurisdictions adhere to the principal of exclusive jurisdiction whereby a union, once certified as the representative of a bargaining unit, represents all workers in the bargaining unit whether or not they choose to join the union. Covered non-members are thus in the 'union sector' in the sense that their wages and working conditions are determined by collective bargaining between the employer and union. Nonetheless, in both Canada and the United States the difference between union membership and collective agreement coverage is not large (as it is in some European countries, such as France and Germany) and use of union membership rather than coverage would not change our results in a substantial way. In both countries, the decline in coverage was much larger in the private sector than in the public sector and larger among males than females. While coverage among part-time workers actually increased slightly in Canada, the decline was concentrated among full-time workers in both countries as well. There is also some variation in the decline in union coverage by age, education, job tenure, and occupation. Nonetheless, the main point that is evident in Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 2 and 3 is that the drop in unionization was quite widespread, and took place in a wide range of industries, occupations and regions.
The SUM and LFS provide information on industry and occupation at the 3 digit level (approximately 50 industries and 50 occupations) and at a more aggregate level similar to the 2 digit level (13 industries and 21 occupations) 7 . We have carried out the analysis with both the finer industry and occupation breakdowns and the more aggregate breakdowns.
The results from the coverage regressions that use the smaller set of industry and occupation controls are presented in Tables 2 and 3 . Using the more detailed set of industry and occupation controls added little to the overall analysis and so, to simplify the reader's task, we will only refer to the above-noted results. However, estimates using the complete set of industry and occupation controls are available from the authors. A value of zero is given as the estimated coefficient for omitted variables in the case of categorical controls. Columns 7 through 10 in Tables 3 and 4 contain the decomposition terms.
Similar changes occurred in the two countries' labour forces between 1984 and 1998.
First, the proportion of the labour force that works part time and the proportion of women in the labour force increased by similar amounts in both countries. As would be expected, the proportion of workers in older age categories -for instance 35-44 and 45-54 -increased while the proportion of workers in the younger age categories fell. Also as expected, there were large changes in the level of education of the work force with the 1998 workers having much higher levels of attainment. There were some minor changes in the industrial composition of both countries, with the size of the public administration, primary and non-durable manufacturing sectors falling and services increasing -especially business services and community services (health, education and social services). Conversely, there were essentially no changes in the provincial/regional composition of the two work forces and, interestingly, there was also little change in the public-private composition. On the whole, the change -or lack of change -in the Canadian and American labour forces was very similar over the 1984 to 1998 period.
For both countries, many of the estimated parameters are also quite similar across the 1984 and 1998 surveys. But, a number of interesting changes have also occurred over time. For instance, public sector workers were even more likely to be unionized relative to private sector workers in 1998 for both Canada and the United States. The estimated coefficient for part-time workers increased by almost twofold for Canada, but this substantial increase was not experienced in the United States. In addition, for Canada, there was a large increase -about seven percentage points -in the propensity to unionize for the highest tenure category (20+ years).
The absence of significant change in the propensity to unionize across provinces is also noteworthy. One of the important developments in Canada during the 1980s and 1990s was the change from card-signing or 'automatic certification' procedures to mandatory voting for union certification in several provinces (Riddell, 2001; Johnson, 2001) . The province of Ontario -the omitted category --introduced mandatory voting for union certification in 1996 whereas this change was introduced earlier in British Columbia, Newfoundland and Alberta (although the B.C. mandatory voting requirement was subsequently reversed). Given that there is a lag comparable between the two countries. For example, the LFS only has one available sales occupation while the sales occupation in the CPS data is broken down into four subcategories.
between changes in certification procedures and changes in union coverage, the Ontario provisions introduced in 1996 would probably not have much influence on union density by December 1998. However, among the provinces that introduced mandatory voting prior to Ontario, only Alberta experienced a decline in the associated coefficient, and only by three percentage points.
One of the few notable differences between the two countries was in the age results. For Canada, generally not much changed over the fifteen years while dramatic changes in the propensity to unionize by age category were experienced in the United States. In particular, younger workers (15-19 and 20-24) were much more likely to be unionized in 1998. For instance, in 1984 individuals of age 15-19 were 13% less likely to be unionized relative to 35-44 year olds. In 1998, however, there was no statistical difference between the same two age categories. As well, 20-24 year olds went from being about 12% less likely to be unionized to only 5% less likely. Of course, these intercountry differences could be partly due to the lack of a tenure variable for the United States.
Clearly the most striking results for Canada, and to some extent the United States, are the large declines in the estimates for many industry categories. For Canada, relative to retail trade, there were large declines in the estimated parameters for every industry group. As well, there were huge declines in the propensity to unionize in community services and public administration. In fact, the coefficient for community services fell by 72%! For the United States, the more dramatic declines were in the same industries as Canada with the exception of community services. Specifically, the propensity to unionize fell substantially in manufacturing, construction, transportation, and public administration.
With respect to occupations -where the omitted category is sales -the decline in the propensity to unionize was less striking with most categories showing no large decline. Three interesting exceptions for Canada were primary occupations (fishing and forestry), machining and material handling. For instance, the estimated coefficient on machining fell by thirteen percentage points while that of material handling fell by 10 percentage points. Both occupations are normally associated with high unionization rates. Table 5 presents the decomposition of the 1984-98 change in union density for Canada and the United States into 'structural' and 'propensity to unionize' components, as discussed previously (see equation (3)). We also report in Table 5 the breakdown of the structural and propensity components into the sub-components associated with the major groups of explanatory variables (public/private, part-time/full-time, job tenure, province, age, gender, education, industry and occupation).
The major finding is that structural changes in the economy and labour force played essentially no role in Canada and only a minor role in the United States. Specifically, for the United States, only 1.84 percentage points out of a total decline in coverage of about 8
percentage points -or approximately 20% -was due to structural factors. Interestingly, for Canada, structural change in the labour force actually worked to increase unionization, albeit only slightly. In fact, the decline in the propensity to unionize in Canada was a full percentage point greater than in the United States. It is worthwhile to note that our decomposition for the United States is almost identical to the findings of Farber (1990) who found that structural factors can account for about 20% of the decline in unionization over the 1977 -1984 period.
For the United States, the key structural factors were the recent decline of the public sector, the increase in part-time work and the decline of certain blue-collar occupations (specifically, precision production occupations and machinists/fabricators).
Given that the changes that have occurred in the Canadian and American labour forces are roughly similar, why were structural factors unimportant in Canada? The explanation is threefold. First, the public sector decline in the United States, while relatively slight, was not experienced in Canada. Second, while part-time work increased by a similar amount in Canada, the 1998 estimated coefficient -which is the weight on the propensity term from equation ( A number of interesting results are found in Table 5 with respect to the decline in the propensity to unionize. First, for the United States, there were a number of factors working for unionization. For instance, there was a large positive age effect due to the increased likelihood of younger workers (particularly the 15-24 category) being unionized. In addition, the increased likelihood of women being unionized worked in favour of the union movement as did some regional and education effects. The latter were somewhat mitigated by a fall in the industrial propensity to unionize, which can be traced to two industry groups: transportation/utilities and durable manufacturing. However, the largest component in the decomposition is in the constant term. This represents a decline in the propensity to be unionized of a worker with the base set of characteristics -that is, a white, male, 35-44 year old, high-school graduate, full-time, retail salesman. Overall, the decline in union coverage in the retail trade sector was the dominating factor. Referring to Table 2 , we see that coverage in retail trade fell by 42.4%, surpassed only by personal and business services. It is useful to note that while the fall in coverage in retail trade was exceeded by these two other industries, retail trade accounts for a substantial part of the total decline in unionization due to its large size -15.4% of the labour force in 1984 and 17.4% of the labour force in 1998.
For Canada, the decomposition is somewhat surprising and certainly intriguing. While there were some other factors that played a minor role -including the increase in public sector coverage offsetting demographic changes as well as some occupational effects -the decline in the industrial propensity to unionize was by far the dominating factor, accounting for about 7
percentage points of the total decline in coverage. Examining the sub-components of the industrial category indicates that two industries -non-durable manufacturing and community services -accounted for 70% of this decline. In fact, the decline in the estimated coefficient on community services alone constituted half of the industrial decline in propensity. This intriguing result requires further analysis. An examination of the full set of industry controls shows that most of the decline in community services coverage was in the health sector although there was a non-trivial decline in educational services as well. Some further analysis indicates that virtually all of the decline of coverage in the health sector was in private sector health services, where average coverage fell from 57% to 31% over the sample years. The reason for the decline in union coverage in private sector health services is beyond this paper's scope, but is an intriguing result worthy of future research.
VI. Conclusion and Discussion
We have investigated the determinants of union coverage in Canada and the United States over the 1984 to 1998 period using micro-data on individual workers. These data provide a large set of explanatory variables for analysing the factors that influence union density. During this period, collective agreement coverage declined by almost 7 percentage points for nonagricultural paid workers in Canada and 8 percentage points in the United States.
Our analysis allows the decline in unionization to be decomposed into two major factors that we refer to as the 'structural' and 'propensity' components. The former corresponds to changes in the composition of the labour force and the structure of the economy that shift employment from sectors with a high degree of unionization to sectors with a low degree of union coverage. Previous analyses of this nature have been done in the United States over the 1960 to 1984 period, but to our knowledge there has been no analysis of the continuing decline of unionization in the United States through the 1990s. Early work by Farber (1985) and Dickens and Leonard (1985) suggested that structural factors were important, contributing to around 40-50% of the fall in unionization. However, Farber (1990) found that structural factors only accounted for about 20% of the decline during the 1977-1984 period and Farber and Krueger (1993) found that structural factors were decreasing in importance when the 1984-1991 period is examined. There appears to be no empirical literature investigating the fall in union coverage in Canada during the 1980s and 1990s.
We find that structural changes accounted for a minor amount of the American decline in union coverage during the sample period -about 20% of the total decline. Thus, our findings coupled with Farber (1990) suggest that while structural change in the economy and labour force may have been an important factor in the decline of unions through the late 1960s and 1970s, it no longer plays an important role. The main reason for the drop in unionization during the 1980s and 1990s was a decline in the likelihood that a worker with a given set of characteristics is represented by a union. This finding is consistent with the views of Freeman (1988) and Weiler (1990) who believe that management opposition and the lengthy nature of organizing drives are responsible for the dramatic decline in organizing bids as well as Farber and Krueger (1993) who argue that a decline in the demand for union representation is the primary reason for the fall in union density.
The Canadian results suggest that structural change accounts for none of the decline in union coverage over the 1984 to 1998 period. The lack of any structural change impacts in Canada is primarily due to no change in public sector employment (versus the decline in the United States) and a large increase -in absolute value -in the propensity of part-time workers to be unionized in Canada (relative to no change in the parameter estimate in the United States).
The decline of union coverage in Canada can be entirely attributed to a fall in the probability of a worker with a given set of characteristics being unionized. This finding is consistent with recent work that suggests that a shift in the political environment -away from "pro-union" legislation and towards "anti-union" legislation -may underlie the fall in union organizing success rates and the number of organizing drives (Johnson, 2001; Riddell, 2001 ).
Interestingly, however, nearly half of the decline in union coverage in Canada is due to a decline in union coverage in the private sector health services industry. Understanding this latter phenomenon is an important goal for future Canadian research. (1) 1998 (2) (2) - (1) [ (2) - (1) (2) - (1) [ (2) - (1) 
